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I. Introduction
This year saw a significant number of oil and gas cases in Pennsylvania.
On the regulatory side, the supreme court rejected an operator’s challenge
to assessments of impact fees on some unconventional vertical wells
(Snyder Bros., Inc. v. PUC) and ruled that zoning hearing boards could
consider evidence from residents of different municipalities as to the oil
and gas operations of a conditional use applicant (EQT Production Co. v.
Jefferson Hills). In an important case, the commonwealth court rejected
constitutional and statutory challenges to a township’s permitting oil and
gas operations in all districts (Frederick v. Allegheny Township ZHB). In
another novel case, the commonwealth court held that oil and gas lessees
could be liable for leasing practices and alleged anticompetitive conduct
under a consumer protection statute (Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v.
Commonwealth).
There were also a number of oil and gas lease dispute cases.
Pennsylvania courts enjoined lessors from interfering with a lessee’s oil
and gas operations (Porter v. Chevron Appalachia, LLC), held that an
underground lateral was not “on the premises” for purposes of a free gas
clause (Mitch v. XTO Energy, Inc.), held that lessee’s prior practice of not
deducting post-production cost deductions did not forbid taking deductions
in the future (MAWC v. CNX Gas Col., LLC), and refused to dismiss
lessors’ claims for breach of a pooling and unitization clause in a lease
(Chambers v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C.). In a rare Pennsylvania
royalty title case, the superior court held in a nonprecedential case that a
deed reservation of royalties and income from oil and gas extended beyond
the current lease (Julia v. Huntley).
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II. Judicial Developments
A. Pennsylvania Supreme Court Cases
1. Snyder Bros., Inc., v. Pa. Pub. Utils. Comm., 198 A.3d 1056 (Pa.
2018), amended on reconsideration, 203 A.3d 964 (Pa. 2019).
$

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that unconventional
vertical wells are “vertical gas wells” subject to assessment of
yearly impact fee if production exceeds 90,000 cubic feet per
day for at least one month of the year.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the commonwealth court’s
en banc decision interpreting the assessment of yearly impact fees on
natural gas wells under Chapter 23 Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Act (“Act
13”). Act 13 imposes impact fees on wells producing from unconventional
formations. Only wells that produce in amounts greater than that of a
stripper well trigger fees.1 “Stripper well” is defined by Act 13 as “[a]n
unconventional gas well incapable of producing more than 90,000 cubic
feet of gas per day during any calendar month[.]”2 The court considered the
use of the word “any” in the definition of stripper well.3 In other words,
would an impact fee be assessed whenever a vertical well's production
exceeds an average of 90,000 cubic feet of natural gas per day for even one
month of the year, or must the well exceed this production threshold in
every month of the year, for the fee to be imposed?4 The commonwealth
court held that the impact fee cannot be imposed on wells where production
from that well fell below the threshold during any month of the year.5
Reversing the en banc commonwealth court, the supreme court concluded
that an impact fee will be assessed on wells if their production exceeds
90,000 cubic feet of natural gas per day for even one month of the year.6
Snyder Brothers drilled a number of unconventional vertical wells in the
Commonwealth and submitted well production data to the Public Utilities
Commission (“PUC”) pursuant to Act 13.7 PUC’s Bureau of Investigation
and Enforcement concluded that Snyder Brothers underreported the
1. 58 PA. STAT AND CONST. STAT. ANN. § 2302(a).
2. Id. § 2301 (emphasis added).
3. Snyder Bros., Inc., v. Pa. Pub. Utils. Comm., 198 A.3d 1056, 1061 (Pa. 2018),
amended on reconsideration, 203 A.3d 964 (Pa. 2019).
4. Id. at 1057.
5. Id. at 1058.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1061.
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number of wells that met the impact fee criteria and filed a complaint
seeking past impact fees and other costs.8 Snyder Brothers responded that
certain wells had not been reported because they were exempt from the
impact fees as stripper wells.9 The Pennsylvania Independent Oil and Gas
Association (“PIOGA”) intervened. A PUC administrative law judge
agreed with the Bureau of Investigation, concluding that a vertical gas well
producing “more than 90,000 cubic feet per day in any calendar month in a
calendar year [is] subject to the impact fee.”10 The administrative law judge
gave “great deference” to the administrative agency to support the Bureau
of Investigation’s assessment of fees.11 Snyder Brothers and PIOGA
appealed to the PUC.
PUC agreed with the administrative law judge, arguing that the
dispositive issue is “whether or not the well met Section 2301's definition
of a stripper well, i.e., did not produce more than 90,000 cubic feet of gas
per day in ‘any calendar month.’”12 The PUC found the term “any”
ambiguous. PUC “expressed its concern that relieving a producer of having
to pay an impact fee based on only one month's reduced production would
create an incentive for ‘unscrupulous producers’ to deliberately reduce
production at a well during one month of a calendar year to avoid paying
the fee for the whole year.”13 PUC supported its liberal construction of the
statute through the government’s desire to collect impact fees. PUC adopted
the decision of the administrative law judge with slight modifications.
Snyder Brothers and PIOGA appealed to the commonwealth court.14
The commonwealth court reversed the PUC en banc.15 The majority
concluded that the term “any” as used in the definition of stripper well is
not ambiguous. Therefore, a well that failed to exceed the 90,000 cubicfoot production threshold in any month of the year was exempt from the
impact fee. 16
While the commonwealth court found the plain meaning of the statute
unambiguous, it analyzed the PUC’s interpretation through its own
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
banc).
16.

Id. at 1060.
Id. at 1061.
Id.
Id. at 1062.
Id.
Id. at 1063.
Id.
Snyder Bros. v. Pa. Pub. Utils. Comm., 157 A.3d 1018 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) (en
Snyder Bros., 198 A.3d at 1063-64.
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statutory construction.17 The majority rejected the notion that the desire to
collect more impact fees for the government “was a legitimate basis for
liberally construing the statute in the manner employed by the PUC.”18 The
majority also declined to give deference to PUC’s interpretation embodied
in its Proposed Rulemaking Orders. Lastly, the majority applied the rule of
lenity—rather than applying a liberal construction—because the penalties
imposed under Act 13 for failure to pay impact fees made the statute penal
in nature.19
On appeal, the supreme court analyzed the commonwealth court’s
decision using a de novo standard of review because the issues of statutory
interpretation are questions of law.20 The majority framed the “pivotal”
question as “the definition of ‘stripper well,’ as it has been incorporated
and utilized in the definition of ‘vertical gas well.’”21 The majority found
that the term “any” can have either of two “divergent” meanings: it could
mean “all or every” or it could mean “one.”22 The court looked to the
context of the use of “any” within the “overall statutory framework in
which it appears” to determine that the term “any” is ambiguous as used in
the definition of stripper well.23 The court then conducted its own statutory
interpretation analysis to ultimately agree with the PUC and disagree with
the commonwealth court.
The court determined that PUC’s interpretation ensured “stability in the
impact fee assessment process,” whereas Snyder Brothers’ and PIOGA’s
interpretation “would lead to an unreasonable result.”24 As a public policy
consideration, the court stated that appellee’s interpretation “would permit
well operators who have enjoyed robust production from their wells for the
majority of a calendar year to avoid paying the impact fees to the
municipalities merely because of the happenstance of one month's
diminished production.”25 With these considerations, the court found that
commonwealth court’s holding impermissibly favored “the private
financial interests of the producers over the public interest of counties and
municipalities in having sufficient fiscal capabilities to protect their
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 1064-65.
Id. at 1065.
Id.
Id. at 1071.
Id. at 1071-72.
Id. at 1072.
Id.
Id. at 1079.
Id.
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residents from the deleterious effects of unconventional drilling
activities.”26 The court held that “under Act 13, an unconventional vertical
well is a ‘vertical gas well’ subject to assessment of an impact fee for a
calendar year whenever that well's natural gas production exceeds 90,000
cubic feet per day in at least one calendar month of that year.”27
2. EQT Prod. Co. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills, 208 A.3d 1010 (Pa.
2019)
$

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that a municipality
could admit the testimony of non-residents in an evidentiary
hearing considering land use permit application.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted a petition for allowance of
appeal to determine whether a municipality could consider testimony from
nonresidents of the community when considering and oil and gas
companies condition use permit application for the construction and
operation of a well site.28
EQT Production Company applied for a conditional use permit in 2015
to drill unconventional oil and gas wells in Jefferson Hills, Allegheny
County.29 There were no existing unconventional wells in Jefferson Hills at
that time. Jefferson Hill’s zoning code permitted unconventional oil and
gas well drilling as a conditional use. Upon consideration of EQT’s
application, the Borough Planning Commission recommended that the
Borough Council approve the permit application.30
The Borough Council conducted a public hearing on the application as
required by the Municipalities Planning Code (“MPC”).31 Eight people
testified at the hearing in opposition to conditional use application (the
“Objectors”) including three that did not live in Jefferson Hills, but resided
in Union Township, Washington County, which is adjacent. Those three
Objectors, along with a resident who recently moved to Jefferson Hills from
Union Township, lived near an unconventional well operated by EQT. They
testified that EQT’s oil and gas activities negatively impacted their health,
quality of life and the community’s environment.32 The Borough Council

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
EQT Prod. Co. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills, 208 A.3d 1010 (Pa. 2019).
Id. 1011-12.
Id. 1012.
Id.
Id. at 1013.
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denied the conditional use application after giving “significant weight” to
the Objectors’ testimony.33
The Borough Council found that EQT’s application met the general
standards and specific requirements for the grant of a conditional use
permit, but concluded that granting the permit for the proposed oil and gas
well “does not protect the health, safety and welfare of the Borough and its
residents[.]”34 The Borough Council determined that “pursuant to
Pennsylvania case law, [EQT] [has] not met [its] burden of proof for a
conditional use application and the burden never shifted to the objectors to
prove that the impact of the proposed use is such that it would violate the
other general requirements for land use set forth in the Borough Zoning
Ordinance.”35 EQT appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County.
The court of common pleas reversed the Borough Council because the
Council had found EQT met the general standards and specific
requirements of the conditional use. Once EQT met the general standards,
the burden should have shifted to the Objectors to prove that the use would
adversely affect the general public.36 The court of common pleas found that
the Objectors did not meet this burden. The court characterized their
testimony as “speculative regarding general oil and gas development,” and
raising only “theoretical concerns about air pollution and odors.”37 The
Borough appealed to the commonwealth court.
A panel of the commonwealth court affirmed the court of common
pleas.38 The panel found that EQT had met its burden of complying with
the requirements of the zoning ordinance, but the Objectors failed to meet
their burden of showing a detrimental impact.39 In her dissent, Judge
Patricia A. McCullough noted that it is difficult for objectors to demonstrate
that a novel use will have a negative impact on the health, safety, and
welfare of the community, because they have not, heretofore, had any
firsthand experience with the particular use.40 Over the dissent, the majority

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
2017).
39.
40.

Id. at 1017.
Id.
Id. at 1017-18.
Id. at 1018.
Id.
See EQT Prod. Co. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills, 162 A.3d 554 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct.
EQT Prod. Co., 208 A.3d at 1019.
Id. at 1020 (McCullough, J., dissenting).
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of the panel agreed that the Objectors’ testimony, which was admitted into
evidence, was too speculative.41
The Borough filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania.42 The court granted the petition and considered the
following issue:43
Whether the Commonwealth Court erred as a matter of law by
imposing a standard upon the admissibility of objectors'
evidence that effectively eliminates the ability to raise any
objection to a land use application based on firsthand experience
with a similar use when the proposed use does not already appear
within municipal borders?
The court reversed the commonwealth court and remanded with
instructions that the court of common pleas with instructions to consider
the nonresident Objectors’ testimony. The court stated that its review is one
of evidentiary admissibility: “whether the testimony of the residents of a
municipality regarding their firsthand experiences with the manner in
which a particular land use was conducted by the owner of property in very
near proximity to their own homes was admissible in a hearing held in
another municipality on a land use application to conduct a similar land use
there.”44
Notably, the court did not find that the commonwealth court reviewed
the testimony for its sufficiency, but instead characterized the
commonwealth court’s finding that the testimony was speculative as
“dismissive.”45 The court stated that the dismissive nature in which the
commonwealth court handled the nonresident testimony “gives credence to
the Borough's concern that the panel decision in this matter will be
interpreted as a categorical bar to the admissibility of this type of firsthand
experiential evidence in future conditional use hearings.”46 With this
foundation, the court explained that the nonresident testimony at issue
should have been admitted.
The court noted that local agencies are not bound by the technical rules
of evidence when conducting hearings, but may consider “all relevant

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1025.
Id.
Id.
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evidence of reasonably probative value.”47 The court found that local
agencies need that flexibility in conditional use hearings because they are
considering that evidence under their duty to protect residents from harm.48
Under that broad evidentiary standard, and in fulfilling their duty to protect,
the court concluded that the testimony of the nonresident Objectors was
relevant and reasonably probative of the affects EQT’s proposed
conditional use could have on Jefferson Hills.49
The court relied on its 1990 decision in Visionquest National, LTD v.
Board of Supervisors of Honey Brook Township, which affirmed the denial
of a conditional use application based in part on the testimony of
neighboring residents.50 There, the operators of a youth rehabilitation
facility sought a conditional use permit that had been operating in the
community without a permit.51 The operator fulfilled the criteria for
conditional use.52 Residents of the community testified as to effects of the
presently operating facility on their daily lives. This included fears of
escapes. Escapes had occurred, but no physical damage had resulted in the
community.53 Additionally, residents from a neighboring community that
had a facility run by the same operator testified that escapes had caused
physical damage in that community. The local governing body denied the
application based in part on the fears articulated by the residents and
nonresidents. The trial court upheld the denial, but the commonwealth court
reversed, finding that the “possibility of an adverse impact, based on
unsupported anxieties, was insufficient to meet the appellant's burden of
proof.”54 The court reversed, rejecting the commonwealth court’s finding
that the evidence was too speculative “because the residents’ testimony was
based on their own firsthand experiences with the operation of the facility.55
Even though the evidence in Visionquest was related to a facility in the
community and based upon testimony of the community’s residents, the
court found the rationale controlling in the present matter.56 “[The]
firsthand experiences with a particular type of land use by people living
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. (citing 2 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 554 (West 2019)).
Id.
Id. at 1026.
569 A.2d 915 (Pa. 1990).
Id. at 916.
Id. at 917.
Id.
Id.
EQT Prod. Co., 208 A.3d at 1026.
Id. at 1026-27.
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near it are relevant and probative evidence for a local government to
consider in evaluating whether a similar land use activity conducted by the
same entity, in a similar manner, and in a similar type of location” is
relevant and reasonably probative of the impact on the community.57
Justice Sallie Mundy dissented, disagreeing with the majority’s finding
that “anecdotal evidence by lay witnesses regarding operations in a
different municipality can serve as a basis for denying a conditional use to
a landowner who has satisfied the objective criteria of the zoning
ordinance.”58 Justice Mundy would have relied upon precedent that shifted
the burden to prove an adverse effect on the community to the Objectors
once EQT met the permitting requirements. Because EQT had met those
requirements, Objectors should have been required to provide sufficient
evidence to establish that there is a high degree of probability that the use
will cause substantial harm to the community.”59 Generalized grievances
do not meet that burden.
The long-term effect of the court’s decision may not be significant. This
opinion held that the evidence is admissible. Here, each tribunal admitted
the evidence of the Objectors, but gave it little weight because of its
speculative nature. As such, the court confirmed the admissibility of nonresident testimony as to harm, but the local agencies and lower courts must
still weigh that evidence against an applicant’s entitlement to a conditional
use permit when it satisfies the specific, objective criteria in the zoning
ordinance for that conditional use.
B. Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Cases
1. Frederick v. Allegheny Tp. Zoning Hrg. Bd., 196 A.3d 677 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. October 26, 2018), pet. for allowance of appeal denied,
449 WAL 2018 (Pa. May 14, 2019)
$

The commonwealth court held that zoning ordinance did not
violate substantive due process, Pennsylvania’s Environmental
Rights Amendment, or the Municipalities Planning Code simply
because it allowed oil and gas development as a permitted use in
all zoning districts where the ordinance required the applicant to
satisfy numerous health, safety and public welfare standards.

The commonwealth court reviewed a substantive validity challenge to a
local zoning ordinance (“Ordinance”) in Frederick v. Allegheny Township
57. Id. at 1027.
58. Id. at 1031 (Mundy, J., dissenting).
59. Id. 1029 (citing In re Cutler Group, 880 A.2d 39, 43 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005)).
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Zoning Hearing Board that also considered the applicability of
Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights Amendment to zoning.60 Three
residents (“Objectors”) challenged the Ordinance in question, which
allowed oil and gas development as a permitted use in all zoning districts,
but subject to certain health, safety and public welfare requirements.61 The
Objectors argued that the Ordinance constituted illegal spot zoning in
violation of substantive due process, violated the Environmental Rights
Amendment (“ERA”) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and violated
several provisions of Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code
(“MPC”).62 The court rejected the challenge en banc, finding that the
municipality acted within state law in determining where oil and gas
development may occur.63
The Allegheny Township Board of Supervisors passed an amendment to
an existing zoning ordinance in 2010 that allowed oil and gas operations in
all zoning districts as a permitted use “by right.” The Ordinance subjected
the application to numerous standards and conditions designed to protect
the public.64
CNX Gas Company, LLC submitted a zoning permit application to
construct an unconventional well pad in an R-2 (Agricultural/Residential)
Zoning District. The application complied with the requirements of the
Ordinance. The Township issued the permit.65 The Objectors appealed the
permit to the Allegheny Township Zoning Hearing Board (“Board”).66 The
Objectors argued the Ordinance allowed an “industrial use” in a
residential/agricultural zoning district in contravention of ERA and in
violation of Objectors’ substantive due process rights. The Objectors cited
the supreme court’s 2013 decision in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth
(hereinafter Robinson II) in support of their argument.67
After holding evidentiary hearings, the Board issued a written decision
containing detailed findings of fact.68 The Board found that the experts and
the evidence submitted by the Objectors was not credible, but found that

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

196 A.3d 677 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 26, 2018).
Id. at 679.
Id.
Id. at 701-02.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 679.
Id.
83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013) (hereinafter Robinson II).
Frederick, 196 A.3d at 683-84.
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the expert and evidence submitted by the permittee was.69 The Board
disagreed with the Objectors’ contentions that the land use would have an
adverse effect on public health, safety and welfare. Instead, the Board found
that the Ordinance promoted the public health, safety, and welfare of the
Township.70 Likewise, the Board did not find that land use would have an
adverse effect on the environment. The Board upheld the validity of the
Ordinance and rejected the Objectors’ reliance on Robinson II.71 The
Objectors appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland
County. The court of common pleas affirmed and the Objectors appealed
to the commonwealth court.72
The commonwealth court affirmed the Board by a 5–2 majority and
issued an en banc opinion. The majority addressed the Objectors’ three
arguments: (1) whether the Township's zoning ordinance violates
substantive due process by instituting illegal spot zoning; (2) whether CNX
Gas Company's permit to develop an unconventional gas well in the R-2
Zoning District violates the ERA; and (3) whether permitting oil and gas
development in every zoning district violates the MPC.73
First, the court held that the Ordinance did not violate substantive due
process. The court noted that the Objectors stated concerns about oil and
gas development outside of industrial zoning districts, but did not support
their concerns with credible evidence, but only with speculation.74 The
court looked to its recent decisions and explained that objections to well
pad construction activities must be based on more than mere speculation of
a possible harm to carry an objector’s burden of proof.75 The court
distinguished oil and gas development from heavy industry that is often
relegated to “industrial” zoning districts.
Next, the majority determined that the Ordinance did not violate the
ERA, which states in relevant part, “[t]he people have a right to clean air,
pure water, and to preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic
values of the environment.”76 Notably, the court concluded that the
69. Id. at 685.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 686.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 687.
75. Id. at 689-90 (citing Gorsline v. Bd. of Supervisors, 123 A.3d 1142 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2015), rev’d on other grounds, 186 A.3d 375; EQT Prod. Co. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills,
162 A.3d 554 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) pet. for allowance of appeal granted in part, 179 A.3d
545 (Pa. 2018)).
76. Art. I, § 27 PA. CONST.
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Township could not “replicate the environmental oversight that the General
Assembly has conferred upon [Department of Environmental Protection]
and other state agencies.”77 The Objectors argued that the Township was
required by Robinson II to complete an environmental impact analysis prior
to passing the 2010 amendments to the Ordinance.78 Furthermore, the
Objectors argued that the permitted use would harm the local
environment.79
The court looked to Robinson II and the recent decision in Pennsylvania
Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth, to state that the
applicable standard should be whether or not the governmental action
“unreasonably impairs those values” provided in the ERA.80 Noting that
“[i]t is axiomatic that a zoning ordinance must balance the public interests
of the community with the due process rights of private property owners,”
the court highlighted that the Township could not act “beyond the bounds
of [its] enabling legislation.”81 Therefore, the Township is precluded from
replicating the environmental oversight afforded to the Department of
Environmental Protection.82
Considering these restraints on the Township’s role, but also applying
the Board’s factual findings, the court concluded that “Objectors did not
prove [the Ordinance] is a law that unreasonably impairs their rights under
the [ERA].”83 In sum, Objectors did not prove that [the Ordinance] does not
reasonably account for the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of
the Township's environment.”
Finally, the majority concluded that the Ordinance did not violate the
MPC by allowing oil and gas development “contrary to the state of
community objectives set forth in [the ordinance],” places “water sources
and other environmental assets at risk,” and allows incompatible uses to
take place within the R-2 Zoning District.”84 The court found these
arguments analogous to those advanced in the substantive due process

77. Id. at 697.
78. Frederick, 196 A.3d at 691.
79. Id. at 693.
80. Id. at 694 (citing Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017)
(PEDF).
81. Id. at 695.
82. Id. at 696.
83. Id. at 697.
84. Id. at 699.
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claim. As such, the court repeated its conclusion that the Objectors failed
to support their claim with credible evidence.85
The majority drafted a conclusion concisely explaining its rejection of
the Objectors’ claims and its affirmance of the Board.86 The conclusion
contained the following short paragraph noting an inconsistency in the
present appeal:87
Objectors’ objectives in this litigation are confounding. Were
they to succeed in invalidating Zoning Ordinance 01-2010, then
they release oil and gas operators from the ordinance conditions
that relate to noise, lighting, hours, security and dust. Absent
Zoning Ordinance 01-2010, CNX's permit could be invalidated.
However, CNX would no longer need a “zoning compliance
permit” to operate the Porter Pad.
In their dissenting opinions, Judge McCullough and Judge Ceisler voiced
concerns over the majority’s application of the ERA. Judge McCullough
would have remanded back to the Board to take additional evidence to
determine whether the Ordinance is compatible with the ERA.88 Judge
McCullough would remand in light of PEDF, but also noted that “the
Township ventured into uncharted, choppy waters when it enacted the
Ordinance” allowing oil and gas development in all zoning districts.89
Notably, Judge McCullough wrote that the Ordinance “should be subjected
to strict scrutiny and analysis in the same manner that courts provide to
other fundamental rights.”90 Judge Ceisler agreed with much of the
majority’s reasoning but dissented because she “took issue with its
conclusion that [the Ordinance] does not violate the [ERA].”91 Judge
Ceisler would hold that the Ordinance “clearly, palpably, and plainly
violated the [ERA].”92
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declined to hear further appeal on
the matter. As such, the commonwealth court decision provides guidance
on the application of the ERA to zoning.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 700.
See id. at 700-02.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 702.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 707.
Id. at 711.
Id. at 715.
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2. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Commonwealth, 206 A.3d 51 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. March 15, 2019)
$

The commonwealth court concluded that (i) a lessee under an oil
and gas lease may be liable under the Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law and (ii) the Attorney General can
maintain anti-trust claims under the UTPCPL.

On interlocutory appeal, the majority of an en banc panel of the
commonwealth court decided that the Office of Attorney General could
bring antitrust claims against oil and gas lessees under the Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”).93 First, the
commonwealth court considered whether the Attorney General could bring
a cause of action against lessees pursuant to the UTPCPL for allegedly
wrongful conduct perpetrated by lessees in the context of leasing
subsurface mineral rights from private landowners.94 Second, the court
determined whether the Attorney General can bring a cause of action
against those lessees pursuant to the UTPCPL for alleged antitrust
violations.95 The court of common Pleas of Bradford County concluded that
the Attorney General could bring both types of claims, and overruled
Appellants’ preliminary objections to the claims.
On appeal, the commonwealth court reviewed whether oil and gas
leasing could trigger actionable claims under the UTPCPL. The General
Assembly declared unlawful 21 separate categories of unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade
or commerce under the UTPCPL along with other acts designated by the
Attorney General through the administrative rulemaking process.96 The
commonwealth court had to first consider whether oil and gas leasing is
“trade or commerce” under the UTPCPL.
The UTPCPL defines “trade and commerce as the advertising, offering
for sale, sale or distribution of any services and any property, tangible, real,
personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value
wherever situate, and includes any trade or commerce directly or indirectly
affecting the people of this Commonwealth.”97 The definition applies to the
93. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Commonwealth, 206 A.3d 51 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019).
94. Id. at 53.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 55 (citing 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 201-3, 201-2(4), 201-3.1)
(internal quotations omitted)).
97. Id. (citing 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-2(3)) (internal quotations
omitted)).
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sale of things of value, but not expressly to the purchasing of a thing or to
the leasing of a thing. Under this definition, Appellants argued that the
UTPCPL is designed to protect consumers against underhanded behavior
of sellers, rather than all parties to a given transaction.98 The court
disagreed, finding that Appellants’ leasing of Appellee’s mineral interest
constitutes “trade and commerce” as those terms are “understood in the
context of the Law.”99 The court cited a case that considered residential
property leasing to be within the definition of “trade and commerce” in
support of its finding.100
Finding that oil and gas leasing fit within “trade and commerce,” the
court then found that the Attorney General stated a legally viable claim
against the Appellants based on allegedly unfair conduct in obtaining the
oil and gas leases. The commonwealth court held that the trial court
properly overruled Appellants’ preliminary objections that their behavior
in securing the oil and gas leases was not actionable under the UTPCPL.
Next, the court considered whether the Attorney General’s “antitrust”
claims were actionable under the UTPCPL. The complaint contained two
separate counts alleging antitrust violations. The first count alleged that
Appellants’ joint venture and market sharing agreements intrinsically
violated the UTPCPL. The second alleged that Appellants “deceived and
acted unfairly towards private landowners by giving them misleading
information, and/or failing to disclose information, regarding the open
market’s true appetite for subsurface mineral rights leases, as well as
whether terms of the agreed-to leases were competitive and fair.”101
Appellants noted that the UTPCPL does not expressly disallow joint
venture agreements, as the Appellants had entered into. Moreover,
Appellants cited to the General Assembly’s repeated failure to pass an
antitrust law. As such, Appellants argued that the Attorney General could
not use the UTPCPL to bring antitrust claims.102
The court agreed with Appellants’ on the first count: the mere existence
of a joint venture does not create “impairment of choice and the competitive
process” to sufficiently state a claim within the 21 enumerated violations
under the UTPCPL.103 The commonwealth court reversed the trial court’s
98.
99.
100.
1974)).
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Monument Props., Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 820-26 (Pa.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 60.
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overruling of Appellants’ preliminary objection to the count alleging the
Appellants’ joint venture was actionable.104
The court affirmed the trial court with regard to the count alleging
deception and unfair actions toward the landowners.105 The court found that
the Attorney General’s allegations fit with one of the enumerated actions
within “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices.”106
Judge Covey filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. Judge Covey
noted that the Appellants are lessees under the oil and gas leases and,
therefore, are purchasers or consumers. Judge Covey agreed with
Appellants, that no court ever interpreted the UTPCPL as authorizing a
claim by or on behalf of a seller against a person who acquires something
from the seller.107 Concluding the UTPCPL is not an antitrust statute, and
that the Majority wrote its own causes of action in to the Law, Judge Covey
concluded, “I find it unconscionable that as a direct result of the Majority’s
decision, Appellants may be retroactively liable for engaging in conduct
that was not considered to be violative of state law at the time such activities
occurred.”108
C. Pennsylvania Superior Court Cases
1. Porter v. Chevron Appalachia, LLC, 204 A.3d 411 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2019).
$

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed a preliminary
injunction enjoining landowners from denying operator access
to surface to construct a well pad to develop oil and gas from
unitized properties.

The Porters appealed an order granting a preliminary injunction in favor
of Chevron that enjoined the Porters from “preventing access to and
development of Chevron’s oil and gas rights.”109 Chevron was the assignee
of a 2002 oil and gas lease (“Lease”) that granted the lessee exclusive rights
to use the surface of the property in conjunction with oil and gas
development “regardless of . . . the location of the wells.”110 The Lease
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 61.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 62 (J. Covey, concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 67.
Porter v. Chevron Appalachia, LLC, 204 A.3d 411, 415 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019).
Id. at 414.
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allowed the lessee to unitize the leased property (“Porter Farm”). Chevron’s
predecessor drilled multiple conventional wells on the Porter Farm. In
2017, Chevron gave notice to the Porters that it intended to construct a well
pad to develop multiple, unconventional wells to produce oil and gas from
neighboring properties.111 The Porters filed a complaint asking for
declaratory relief that the court declare Chevron may not use the surface of
the Porter Farm to construct a well pad for use in the production of oil and
gas from neighboring properties.112 Chevron filed preliminary objections to
the complaint.
While the preliminary objections were pending, Chevron notified the
Porters that it would be entering the property to conduct environmental and
geophysical investigations and that it would be “staking” the property in
accordance with Pennsylvania’s One Call System.113 Chevron personnel
arrived to find the gate to the property locked. After staking the property,
one of the Porters removed the stakes and confronted Chevron personnel
upon their return. He then stated to the Chevron personnel, “you best get
off my property while the getting’s good.”114 Chevron considered the
statement as a threat, left the property, and filed a motion for injunctive
relief.115 After a hearing, the trial court granted Chevron’s motion and
Porters appealed.
The Porters raised three issues on appeal before the superior court:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the
Porters to permit Chevron to conduct geotechnical testing on the
surface of the Porter Farm where Chevron failed to provide any
clear evidence that it would suffer immediate and irreparable
harm if such testing was delayed?
2. Where Chevron had never previously entered onto the surface
of the Porter Farm to conduct any activities relative to the
production of oil and gas from beneath adjoining lands, whether
the trial court erred or abused its discretion by effectively
changing that status quo by ordering the Porters to permit
Chevron such access?

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 415.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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3. Whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused
its discretion by effectively determining on the merits that
Chevron has an absolute right to operate on the surface of the
Porter Farm to produce oil and gas from beneath adjoining lands
in order to support its grant of a mandatory preliminary
injunction?116
The superior court began by reciting the six factors that must be
established to show a party is entitled to a preliminary injunction:
(1) [R]elief is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable
harm that cannot be adequately compensated by money
damages; (2) greater injury will occur from refusing to grant the
injunction than from granting it; (3) the injunction will restore
the parties to their status quo as it existed before the alleged
wrongful conduct; (4) the petitioner is likely to prevail on the
merits; (5) the injunction is reasonably suited to abate the
offending activity; and (6) the public interest will not be harmed
if the injunction is granted.117
Porters’ first issue on appeal related to prevention of “immediate and
irreparable harm.”118 They argued that Chevron failed to show that a delay
would be more than an “inconvenience to Chevron.”119 The trial court
disagreed, citing precedent that irreparable harm is deemed to exist where
the rights involve interference with contractual rights in land.120 “In light of
the unique and intrinsic value of land, interference with ... contractual rights
to ownership of that land must be deemed irreparable harm.”121 The
superior court agreed that the Porters’ actions “deprived Chevron of
contractual rights in land pursuant to the 2002 lease, which in and of itself
supports a finding of irreparable harm.”122
Additionally, Chevron introduced evidence demonstrating that
interference with Chevron’s access to perform the necessary testing “would

116. Id. at 416
117. Id. (citing Brayman Constr. Corp. v. Com. Dep’t of Transp., 13 A.3d 925, 925 (Pa.
2011)).
118. Id. at 416.
119. Id. at 417.
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing New Eastwick Corp. v. Phila. Builders Eastwick Corp., 241 A.2d 766, 770
(Pa. 1968)).
122. Id.
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result in delay-related costs that would be impossible to quantify.”123
Considering both the interference with Chevron’s contractual rights in land
and the evidence that damages could not be accurately quantified, the
superior court concluded that the record contained reasonable grounds for
the trial court to find irreparable harm.
Second, the Porters argued that preliminary injunctive relief should
restore the status quo. Porters argued that Chevron, itself, had never entered
the property prior to its recent entry to stake the property.124 The trial court
disagreed, finding that “the status quo existing immediately prior to the
wrongful conduct was that Chevron's predecessor, Atlas, had access to the
Porters' land under the Lease as well as in practice. Chevron, as successorin-interest to Atlas under the Lease, is entitled to the same status.”125
Because Atlas had access under the Lease, Porters’ interference with
Chevron’s access disrupted the status quo. The superior court concluded
that these were reasonable grounds for the trial court to find that the
injunction was necessary to restore the status quo.126
Finally, the Porters argued that the trial court improperly adjudicated the
ultimate issue by determining Chevron could access the property “for
whatever oil and production activities it wants” under the Lease. Id.
Paragraph 10 of the lease (unitization clause) expressly states:
Lessee the right at any time to consolidate the leased premises
or any part thereof ... with other lands to form an oil and gas
development unit or units ... for the purpose of drilling a
well thereon, but the Lessee shall in no event be required to drill
more than one well on any such unit or units.127
The Porters argued that this clause only allowed Chevron to drill one well
on the property. To the Porters, Chevron’s proposed use exceeded the scope
of the lease.128
First, the trial court disposed of the argument that the trial court’s order
gave Chevron unfettered access.129 The injunction only allowed access “for
the limited purposes of conducting necessary testing to obtain a DEP

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 418 (emphasis original).
Id.
Id. at 419.
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permit.”130 Second, one of the factors weighed by the court when
considering an injunction is whether the moving party is likely to prevail
on the merits of the case—the movant must “establish a prima facie right
to relief.131 As such, the trial court is required to analyze the underlying
claims. Here, the terms of the lease gave rise to the action. The trial court
was required to analyze and interpret the terms of the lease to determine
whether Chevron was likely to prevail on the merits.132
Applying principles of contract law to interpret the clause, the superior
court agreed with the trial court’s determination that the Lease allowed the
lessee to unitize the land for the purposes of drilling, but use of the
indefinite article “a” did not restrict the lessee to only drilling one well.133
Considering the remaining clause of that sentence, that “Lessee shall in no
event be required to drill more than one well,” the trial court concluded that
the context of the use of “a” well did not limit Chevron to drilling one well,
it simply provided that Chevron was “not required to drill more than one
well.”134 The superior court concluded that reasonable grounds existed for
the trial to conclude Chevron was likely to succeed on the merits of the case
and affirmed the grant of injunctive relief.135
2. Mitch v. XTO Energy, Inc., 212 A.3d 1135 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019)
$

The superior court held that an underground lateral was not a
well “drilled on the leased premises” for purposes of a free gas
clause

Lessor Mitch brought an action in 2016 against lessee XTO Energy, Inc.
(“XTO”) for breach of an oil and gas lease relating to alleged payments due
under a free gas clause.136 Paragraph 4 of the lease addendum provided that:
If any well(s) is (are) drilled on the lease premises and is (are)
producing in paying quantities, the surface owner shall be
entitled to receive a payment in lieu of free gas equal to 300,000
cubic feet of gas multiplied by the average price received by

130.
131.
2013)).
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id. (citing Synthes USA Sales, LLC v. Harrison, 83 A.3d 242, 249 (Pa. Super. Ct.
Id.
Id. at 418.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 419.
Mitch v. XTO Energy, Inc., 212 A.3d 1135 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019).
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Lessee during the preceding year of production, provided the
surface owner has his primary residence on the lease premises.137
After the lease was executed, XTO built a well pad on adjacent property
and unitized the multiple tracts, including the lease premises, under a
pooling and unitization clause.138 A lateral well was drilled on the wellpad
that passed under Mitch’s tract. Mitch and XTO brought motions for
summary judgment after discovery and the Court of Common Pleas of
Butler denied Mitch’s motion for summary judgment and granted XTO’s.139
On appeal, the superior court noted that oil and gas leases are subject to
the rules of contract interpretation, with the court’s goal being to
interpreting the lease to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the
parties.140 Mitch argued that because a horizontal well passed through the
leased tract, that well is “on the lease premises” for purposes of the lease
addendum Paragraph 4. XTO argued that only a well on the surface of the
property constituted a well “on the leased premises” for purposes of
Paragraph 4.141
The superior court found that Paragraph 4 was unambiguous.142 The
court further concluded that the parties intended the term “on the leasehold
premises” in Paragraph 4 to mean on the surface of the leasehold.143 “It is
unreasonable to find that the parties intended to compensate a surface
owner (who may be different from the lessor) where a well, situated on the
surface of another’s property, has a horizontally-drilled portion that
traverses the surface owner’s land thousands of feet beneath the surface.”144
The use of the phrase “on the lease premises” to indicate the location of
Mitch’s house in the second part of Paragraph 4 also supported this
interpretation. The superior court affirmed the ruling of the trial court.145

137. Id. at 1137.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1138 (citing Porter v. Chevron Appalachia, LLC, 204 A.3d 411, (Pa. Super. Ct.
2019)) .
141. Id. at 1140.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1141 (citing Trizechahn Gateway LLC v. Titus, 976 A.2d 474, 483 (Pa. 2009);
RESPA of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Skillman, 768 A.2d 335, 340 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001)).
144. Id. (emphasis in original).
145. Id. at 1142.
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3. Julia v. Huntley, No. 632 MDA 2018, 2019 WL 311121 (Pa. Super.
Ct. Jan. 24, 2019).
$

In a non-precedential decision, the superior court held that a
deed reservation of “one half of any and all royalties and income
or return from any oil or gas which may be produced on or from
the premises hereby conveyed” reserved oil and gas rights
beyond lease in effect at time of execution

Julia was the successor to grantee of deed 1931 that reserved “one half
of any and all royalties and income or return from any oil or gas which may
be produced on or from the premises hereby conveyed.”146 In 2007 Julia
executed an oil and gas lease, which was amended in 2011 to designate that
half of the royalties be paid to the Huntleys, heirs of the grantors of the
1931 deed.147 In 2015 Julia filed a quiet title action against the Huntleys,
claiming title to all the oil and gas in and under his property. The Huntleys
entered appearances and filed a motion for summary judgment which was
granted by the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County.148
On appeal Julia argued that “the Huntley-Ames deed only reserved one
half of the royalty payments from the oil and gas produced, not one-half of
the oil and gas itself.”149 Julia further contended that the royalty payments
were only reserved under the then-existing lease and that once the lease
terminated the oil and gas rights reverted to his predecessor.150
A reservation is the creation of a right or interest that did not previously
exist; but if the thing or right exists at the time of conveyance, the deed’s
language is treated as making an exception.151 The superior court concluded
that the deed language was not ambiguous, noting that “[i]f Huntley had
intended to limit the reservation clause to the lease with Northeastern, he
could have included language reflecting that intent.”152 The court concluded
that “[b]y intentionally placing the word ‘and’ between the two phrases
‘one half of any and all royalties’ and ‘income or return from any oil or
gas,’ Huntley meant to reference circumstances in addition to the lease, i.e.,

146.
2019).
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Julia v. Huntley, No. 632 MDA 2018, 2019 WL 311121, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 24,
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4 (citing Ralston v. Ralston, 55 A.3d 736, 741 (Pa. Super. 2012)).
Id.
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royalties and oil and gas rights.”153 The superior court affirmed the
judgment of the court of common pleas in favor of the Huntleys.
D. Federal District Court Cases
1. Mun. Auth. of Westmoreland Cty. v. CNX Gas Co., L.L.C., 380 F.
Supp. 3d 464 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2019).
$

Lessor failed to state breach of lease claim or conversion claim
based on lessee’s prior waiver of post-production cost
deductions, but stated sufficient claim that deductions were
unreasonable to survive motion for summary judgment

Lessor Municipal Authority of Westmoreland County (“MAWC”) and
prior lessee, Dominion Exploration & Production, Inc., entered into an oil
and gas lease in 2002 covering 2,255 acres in Westmoreland County,
Pennsylvania.154 Lessee did not deduct post-production costs (“PPCs”). The
lease was subsequently assigned to CNX Gas Company, LLC (“CNX”),
and Noble Energy, Inc. (“Noble”), and in 2011 they began deducting postproduction costs from royalty payments.155 MAWC filed a lawsuit in state
court against CNX and Noble for breach of the lease and conversion. Noble
removed the case to federal district court. The parties cross-moved for
summary judgment.
MAWC did not dispute that the lease expressly permitted the deduction
of PPCs but argued that the lease was modified or that the right to deduct
PPCs was “waived.”156 The district court concluded that MAWC was
arguing that the lease was modified (as opposed to a waiver of the right to
deduct PPCs from past royalty payments).157 However, there was
insufficient evidence of a modification of the lease. There was no
consideration for a modification of the lease, as required under
Pennsylvania law.158 Nor did MAWC establish that it detrimentally relied
on royalty payments without deduction of PPCs.159 Claims for equitable
estoppel failed as well, due to MAWC’s failure to establish detrimental
153. Id. (emphasis original).
154. Mun. Auth. of Westmoreland Cty. v. CNX Gas Co., 380 F. Supp. 3d 464 (W.D. Pa.
2019).
155. Id. at 467.
156. Id. at 468-70.
157. Id. at 470.
158. Id. at 471 (citing Shedden v. Anadarko E. & P. Co., 136 A.3d 485, 490 (Pa. 2016)).
159. Id. at 472 (noting that royalties constituted approximately five percent of MAWC’s
budget and that royalty income exceeded budgeted revenues).
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reliance, and the district court dismissed MAWC’s claims for breach for
deducting PPCs and equitable estoppel.160
The district court refused to dismiss MAWC’s claims that CNX and
Noble improperly deducted processing costs charged by a CNX affiliate for
dry gas that did not require processing.161 Similarly, MAWC raised a triable
issue as to whether Noble improperly deducted electricity costs that were
not used to compress MAWC’s gas.162
The district court dismissed MAWC’s remaining claims for conversion
under the gist of the action doctrine. Under the gist of the action doctrine,
a party cannot assert a tort claim against another party to a contract when
the gravamen of such a claim is, in actuality, breach of contract.163 If the
duty is created by the terms of the contract, then the claim sounds in breach
of contract; if it derives from a party’s “broader social duty owed to all
individuals,” the claim must be regarded as a tort.164 The district court found
that the duty to pay royalties was purely contractual, hence MAWC’s
conversion claims were improper.165
2. Chambers v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 359 F. Supp. 3d 268
(M.D. Pa. 2019).
$

The district court denied motion to dismiss lessor’s claims for
breach of lease’s unitization clause and royalty clause

Oil and gas lessors, including the Chambers, brought an action against
lessees alleging breaches of unitization clauses and royalty clauses in the
leases.166 The unitization clause provided that:
Lessor hereby grants to the Lessee the right at any time to
consolidate the leased premises or any part thereof or strata
therein with other lands to form [an] oil, gas, and/or coalbed
methane gas development unit of not more than 640 acres, or
160. Id. at 473 (“Under the theory of equitable estoppel applicable to contracts, a party’s
conduct may modify an existing contract if: (1) the conduct induces another contracting party
to act in a manner contrary to the agreement’s terms, and (2) the other party justifiably relies
on this conduct to its detriment.” (citing Kreutzer v. Monterey Cty. Herald Co., 747 A.2d 358,
362 (Pa. 2000))).
161. Id. at 475-76.
162. Id. at 477.
163. Id. at 477 (citing Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106A.3d 48, 68 (Pa. 2014)).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 478 (citing Rahemtulla v. Hassam, 539 F. Supp. 2d 755, 777 (M.D. Pa. 2008)).
166. Chambers v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 359 F. Supp. 3d 268, 272 (M.D. Pa.
2019).
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such larger unit as may be required by state law or regulation for
the purpose of drilling a well thereon and Lessee shall be
required to maintain a well density of at least 1 well per 160
acres contained in such unit.167
Lessees formed the Wootten North Unit containing 300 acres with one
well. Lessors alleged that doing so violated the well density requirement in
the clause of “1 well per 160 acres contained in such unit.”168
The lessors also alleged that lessees violated the royalty clauses by
deducting post-production costs from gas royalty payments.169 The leases
contained language that was crossed out stating that the royalty would “less
or net any post-production costs paid by Lessee to prepare for and/or deliver
the oil, gas, and/or coalbed methane gas for sale[.]”170 Lessee Chesapeake
Appalachia, L.L.C., allegedly violated the clause by deducting postproduction costs directly while lessee Equinor Onshore USA Properties,
Inc. (“Equinor”), allegedly violated the clauses by selling gas at an
artificially lower price to an affiliate.171
Lessees argued that the well density requirement only applied to a
“larger unit as may be required by state law or regulation” whereas lessors
argued it applied to all wells. The district court found that the clause was
patently ambiguous as to the proper interpretation. Lessees further argued
that under the clause a well was only required for each 160 acres meaning
that only a unit of 320 acres would require two wells. On the other hand,
lessors argued that a unit with greater than 160 acres required at least two
wells. The district court found in favor of lessors, reasoning that lessor’s
interpretation “would yield strange results elsewhere in the contracts.”172
The court denied the motion to dismiss.
Regarding the claim that Equinor violated the royalty clause, the court
noted that the claim that Equinor had sold gas at an artificially low price
was based on a duty to market the gas.173 Lessee noted that the lease
expressly disclaimed any implied covenants.174 Lessors argued that the
lease created an express duty for lessee to “market” the gas, by describing
167. Id. at 273.
168. Id. (internal quotation omitted)
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 273-74.
172. Id. at 278
173. Id. at 279 (citing Canfield v. Statoil USA Onshore Properties Inc., No. CV 3:16-0085,
2017 WL 1078184, at *22 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2017)).
174. Id. at 280.
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using the phrase “marketed and used off the premises.” The district court
found that lessors’ argument was “reasonable” and that it would avoid “the
absurd and unreasonable result that Equinor could sell gas to ENG for a
nominal fee and still comply with the leases.”175 The district court
acknowledged that the lease did not broad express duty to market language,
but ultimately concluded that “I am not convinced at this early stage that
the royalty clauses are unambiguous in the way Equinor suggests.”176 The
district court denied the motion to dismiss the royalty claim against
Equinor.

175. Id. (citing W.W. McDonald Land Co. v. EQT Prod. Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 790, 804
(S.D.W. Va. 2013)).
176. Id. at 281.
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